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Abstract 
 
Although the guilty plea is unknown in the German criminal procedure, informal negotia-
tions which can be compared to plea bargaining in common law systems, play an increasing 
role in the German criminal process. Like plea bargaining in England and Wales, informal 
agreements in Germany have long been strongly criticised. 
After years of debate among academics and practitioners and developing case law on in-
formal agreements, the German Federal Parliament has now passed new legislation which 
regulates agreements and makes them part of the formal procedure (Gesetz zur Regelung der 
Verständigung im Strafverfahren). This paper will discuss the development and current prac-
tice of informal procedures in Germany and analyse the new legislation. It will argue that the 
German legislator has missed the opportunity to debate the underlying problems which made 
informal negotiations necessary in the first place. 
Introduction 
In German criminal trials the common law instrument of the guilty plea is unknown. 
Consequently one cannot speak of plea bargaining in the strict sense. Nevertheless, informal 
negotiations which centre on the exchange of a confession for a sentence concession play an 
increasing role in the German process.
1
 It is claimed that today in Germany “the criminal pro-
cedure cannot be imagined without the phenomenon of informal agreements.”2 After years of 
academic debate and developing case law on informal agreements, the German Federal Par-
liament
3
 has now passed new legislation which regulates agreements and makes them part of 
the formal procedure. 
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As a civil law country, the German criminal justice system
4
 is based on the notion that the 
prime task of a criminal trial is to find the material truth.
5
 Rather than deciding which of the 
contesting parties can present the better case, in Germany it is the court itself which has to 
bring the facts of the case to light. §244(2) German Code of Criminal Procedure
6
 reads: “In 
order to establish the truth, the court shall, proprio motu, extend the taking of evidence to all 
facts and means of proof relevant to the decision.” Finding the truth is an objective goal and 
not at the parties‟ disposal. Hence, an admission of guilt alone is not sufficient to convict the 
defendant. A confession is rather just one among many forms of evidence and has no proce-
dural function as such. In particular, it is not sufficient to end or even avoid the main hearing.  
Nevertheless, in Germany today one can find at all stages of the procedure some kind of 
negotiations, which are indeed comparable to the Anglo-American plea bargaining. This pa-
per will outline the development and current practice of informal procedures in Germany and 
discuss the new procedure which was introduced in 2009. 
The early beginnings of informal agreements in Germany 
As in England and Wales, so in Germany, informal negotiations initially spread without 
being noticed. At the time when the American scholar John Langbein claimed Germany to be 
the “Land Without Plea Bargaining”7 informal settlements were already being used regularly. 
Although it is very likely that in some form there have always been informal agreements
8
 it is 
assumed that the regular engagement in such negotiations was established in large-scale pro-
ceedings, such as economic crime
9
, tax evasion, environmental crime, and drug related 
crime
10
 around the mid 1970s.
11
 One explanation for the rapid spread of informal settlements 
in these areas is that both courts and prosecution offices became increasingly overworked.
12
 
During the last four decades, these areas experienced a considerable growth in the number of 
criminal cases. Economic crime has been prosecuted more intensively, and the number of 
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drug offences has grown immensely in this time. However, as Rieß
13
 has shown, the number 
of legal staff has increased accordingly so that the rising number of cases alone does not ex-
plain sufficiently the development of informal agreements. Rather than the growing number 
of cases, it was the multiplying length of the individual proceedings which led practitioners to 
look for new means of coping with the case work. The reasons for significantly lengthier trials 
lie in important changes in substantive criminal law in these areas. Since the end of the 1970s, 
environmental criminal law, drug related criminal law, tax evasion, fiscal offences and espe-
cially economic criminal law have all been developed, amended and most of all extended.
14
 
Arguably, the most important development is the change of actus reus and causation. In many 
new offences, especially in environmental and economic crime, rather than one single identi-
fiable action causing harm, the causation of a danger itself has become the actus reus of the 
offence. The traditional concepts of conduct or result crimes are replaced by „causation of 
danger crimes‟. This makes it extremely difficult to prove the offence.15 At what point does a 
legitimate risk become an illegal danger? What is the scope of causation for that risk? To 
what extent did the defendant need to appreciate the risk? In order to eliminate the problems 
of evidence, criminal liability has moved forward on the scale of actions, so that the actus 
reus is assumed much earlier in the chain of actions.
16
 The distinction between legal and 
criminal behaviour becomes then increasingly dependent on the state of mind of the defen-
dant. For example an action is deemed dangerous if the defendant perceived or could have 
perceived the risk. Without a confession, proving the mens rea requires a lot of indirect evi-
dence. Investigation in these kinds of crimes calls for the screening of hundreds of documents 
and the testimony of dozens of witnesses (who sometimes have to be brought from abroad, for 
example when dealing with multinational trade). Consequently, the length of investigation as 
well as of trials where the evidence needs to be presented and evaluated has multiplied. The 
complex German criminal procedure, with its manifold procedural safeguards is not equipped 
to deal with these new requirements of substantive law. Even if the increase of judicial per-
sonnel could initially offset the increasing number of processes, their swelling length and in-
tensity has led inevitably to an enormous overload for the prosecution offices and the courts.
17
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Thus, economic large-scale crimes are considered the pacesetter as well as the principal do-
main
18
 for informal settlements.
19
 
In 1982, a criminal defence lawyer under the pseudonym of Detlef Deal published an arti-
cle in Germany describing in detail the common practice of informal negotiations in large-
scale criminal cases.
20
 He made it very clear that this practice was both widespread as well as 
hidden: “Nearly everybody knows it; nearly everybody does it, only nobody speaks it out 
loudly.”21 In his view the formal trial has degenerated to „a theatre‟ where the participants 
pretend to contribute to the finding of a sentence, which in reality has been already agreed on 
by all parties. In spite of strong criticism from all sides, the judiciary was not discouraged 
from engaging in informal settlements. Most practicing lawyers today agree that courts re-
sponsible for economic crime would not be able to cope with the flood of large-scale cases, if 
it were not for informal agreements.
22
 For example in the state of Lower Saxony over 80 per 
cent of judgements in the area of organised crime are based on an informal agreement.
23
 In-
terestingly, informal proceedings have spread to middle serious crime too
24
 and today they 
can even be found in serious violent crimes such as rape, aggravated robbery and murder,
25
 
although this is still exceptional.
26
 
Main reasons for informal settlements 
The numerous reasons for the development and spread of informal negotiations into all ar-
eas of criminal law in Germany can only be summarised here. As in the Anglo-American dis-
course, German commentators usually mention the increasing overwork of courts and prose-
cution offices as the main reason for the spread of informal negotiations. Legal experts have 
no doubt that criminal procedure would break down without informal handling of cases.
27
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Thus it is claimed, informal negotiations help to sustain and stabilise the current criminal jus-
tice system.
28
 Another major reason is the nature of modern legislation itself. The growing 
complexity of some areas means that courts are not just overworked, but actually out of their 
depth.
29
 Further, the change from conduct or result crimes to „causation of danger crimes‟ 
means that the outcome of cases is much less predictable.
30
 It is this unpredictability which 
makes pre-trial agreements compelling for both defence and prosecution. For all courtroom 
actors informal agreements mean easier and faster completion of the case. 
An additional reason for the rise of informal procedures is the shift in theories of punish-
ment. The traditional idea that the primary function of punishment is retribution has now been 
complemented by the idea of general and specific deterrence.
31
 The purpose of deterrence 
legitimises efficient as well as time and cost saving procedures as opposed to the absolute 
theory of retribution, which is guided by the considerations of justice only.
32
 Herrmann fur-
ther points out that the function of the criminal process is no longer only to enforce the Penal 
Code but also to help to find solutions for social problems. According to him, more justice is 
achieved when all participants agree on the outcome and rehabilitation is more likely to suc-
ceed when the defendant accepts the sentence.
33
 But agreeing to the mildest sanction possible 
does not necessarily mean accepting the judgement; rather it might merely mean choosing the 
lesser evil. 
Related to the change of sentencing purposes is the argument that the development of in-
formal proceedings mirrors the development of a new relationship between state and citizen.
34
   
The vertical interrelation in criminal law between the powerful state and its subordinate citi-
zens is being replaced by a correlation between more equal partners. This different relation-
ship has long been recognised in administrative law where the state is in discussion with the 
citizen to find a solution of the problem rather than exposing them to sanctions as in criminal 
law. In criminal law the decisive change again strarted in white collar and environmental 
crime where the new extended legislation disregards the principle of ultima ratio.
35
 Areas 
previously dealt with by administrative law, which is open to negotiations between state and 
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citizen,
36
 are now subjected to the inflexible criminal procedural law with its principle of 
compulsory prosecution.
37
 As life becomes much more complicated, legislation expands the 
scope of the Penal Code to embrace more and more behaviours which do not ordinarily be-
long to the classical notion of crime, for example forbidden waste disposal.
38
 Whereas crimi-
nal law traditionally used to deal with deviant behaviour committed by individuals outside or 
at least at the margins of society, criminal law now spreads into all areas of society.
39
 In rela-
tion to this Bussmann states that the courts tend to be lenient in large-scale proceedings not 
only because they are overtaxed with the complexity of the complicated legal provisions but 
due to class distinguishing tendencies.
40
 Defendants of fiscal offences, tax evasion, or envi-
ronmental crime are often most respected members of society from similar backgrounds as 
prosecutors and judges. Both of these aspects had an effect on the criminal process. Whereas 
criminal procedure traditionally reflected the subordination of the citizen to the state, a new 
form of interaction emerged in which the parties try to solve situations of conflict by co-
operating and consenting.
41
 As a result, the defendant‟s autonomy in criminal procedures has 
increased.
42
 Informal agreements reflect this development by replacing formal accusation and 
judgement with informal discussion and negotiations. 
Procedural framework 
It is important to examine how a practice similar to plea bargaining could be introduced 
into the German criminal procedure which does not recognise the guilty plea. Although some 
negotiations are initiated in the context of the main hearing, many informal agreements are 
linked to those procedures which provide the prosecution with some discretion because they 
are exceptions to the principle of compulsory prosecution according to which all crimes have 
to be prosecuted. 
One of the core procedures that is used to open the way for informal negotiations is the 
penal order.
43
  §407 gives the prosecutor in a case of a misdemeanour the power to request an 
order imposing punishment from the judge if there is sufficient suspicion.
44
 If the accused 
                                                 
36 Schmidt-Hieber, Werner “Absprachen im Strafprozeß – Privileg des Wohlstandskriminellen? ” (1990) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1884. 
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39 Gerlach, Götz 1992 Absprachen im Strafverfahren: ein Betrag zu den Rechtsfolgen fehlgeschlagener 
Absprachen im Strafverfahren (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang) at 23. 
40 Bussmann note 16 above, at 29. 
41 Herrmann note 14 above, at 78. 
42 Schünemann note 31 above, at 1898. 
43 Schmidt-Hieber, Werner 1982 “Vereinbarungen im Strafverfahren” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1017. 
44 §§407 ff . 
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does not appeal against it the penal order replaces any further proceeding and the offender 
will immediately be punished with a fine or a sentence on probation. Thus it avoids a full trial 
and comes very close to the guilty plea in common law systems. Hence it is not surprising that 
the penal order is a welcome starting point for informal negotiations. Defence Counsel and 
prosecutor might agree that the prosecution will not bring further charges, and request only a 
penal order if the accused is willing to accept the punishment suggested by the order.
45
 Typi-
cally, the defence lawyer and the prosecutor negotiate the amount of the sanction, with the 
judge usually agreeing to the order suggested by the prosecution.
46
 Today, some 35 per cent 
of all cases are handled through a penal order
47
 and it is realistic to assume that many of those 
are based on informal settlements. 
The other major starting point for informal agreements is the dismissal. According to §153 
a case of misdemeanour can be dismissed on the ground of insignificance by the prosecution 
with agreement of the court, if there is only minor culpability and no public interest in prose-
cution. Once the trial has commenced, the court too can dismiss the case with the agreement 
of both prosecution and the defendant. This provision too, is an exception to the principle of 
compulsory prosecution. However, initially §153 could be used only under very restricted 
circumstances and practitioners asked to widen its remit. At the insistence of the judiciary, in 
1974 §153a was introduced in order to fight mass petty crime. This provision enables the 
prosecutor to refrain from some or all charges, even when there is generally an interest in 
prosecuting, if this interest can be overridden because the defendant fulfils certain conditions, 
usually by paying a sum to charity.
48
 Initially, §153a was criticised harshly as an “introduc-
tion of the American plea bargaining”, “shady horse trading”, “whispering procedure”, and 
“buying off procedure”.49 However, this rule was not a new creation. The legislature in fact 
followed an existing informal practice to assume that the public interest in prosecution can be 
met as soon as the accused obeys the prosecution‟s directive. It is an example of how court-
room actors extended a legal provision to such an extent that the legislator saw himself com-
pelled to adjust the law to the lawyers rather than the other way round. This turned out to be-
come the common pattern for the development of informal agreements in Germany. Although 
the legislator followed the demands of the practitioners and formalised negotiations to some 
                                                 
45 Herrmann note 14 above, at 56. 
46 Ibid. at 66. 
47 Schünemann, Bernd 1990 Absprachen im Strafverfahren? – Grundlagen, Gegenstände und Grenzen 
(München: C.H.Beck‟sche Verlagsbuchhandlung) at B153 fn 461. There are German states where more cases are 
handled with the order than by trial (Herrmann note 14 above, at 65). 
48
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of the defendant and the prosecutor. 
49 Schmidt-Hieber note 24 above, at 50. 
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extent, courtroom actors kept operating beyond the new legal framework. §153a provides 
safeguards against informal settlements, such as the restriction on misdemeanour offences, 
minor guilt and clear evidence, but nevertheless this provision is excessively used in large-
scale proceedings, which are neither mass nor petty crime
50
 and the safeguards are usually 
bypassed.
51
 In 1993 the provision extended the restriction of minor guilt by stating that “the 
seriousness of the guilt does not require the contrary”.52 Once again, legislation followed the 
common practice of extending the criteria beyond the law.
53
 §153a is nowadays frequently 
used as a basis for informal settlements. Especially during the preliminary investigation, it is 
common for the courtroom actors to agree that the investigation will cease if the accused pays 
a fine.
54
 
In practice, §153a can be extended either in favour of the defendant or to their disadvan-
tage. It is to their disadvantage that the application of §153a violates the rights of the accused 
in cases where there is insufficient suspicion of a criminal act
55
 and the presumption of inno-
cence should mean that there is no prosecution at all. As in England and Wales, the common 
practice of exchanging a dismissal for a confession or waiver of appeal can result in the 
prosecutor charging a more serious offence simply in order to have more substance to bargain 
with.
56
 More often, however, §153a is extended in favour of the accused, particularly for eco-
nomic crime when §153a is applied even when there is more than just minor guilt.
57
 Often the 
case is re-defined to fit the requirements of §153a, for example perjury might be reframed as a 
false unsworn statement.
58
 
The context of informal negotiations 
Informal settlements in Germany occur most often when the case involves complicated 
questions of evidence or law. The more a court is overworked, the greater is its willingness to 
avoid complicated cases.
59
 Schünemann found in his research that 77 per cent of judges, 72 
per cent of prosecutors and 51 per cent of defence lawyers favour informal settlement if the 
                                                 
50 Bussmann note 16 above, at 28. 
51 Herrmann note 26 above, at 775. 
52 Interestingly, the legislation did not take this opportunity to address informal settlements one or way or the 
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even if the requirements are not strictly fulfilled if the court wants to reward a confession or withdrawal from 
motion for admission of evidence; Rönnau note above 1, at 32. 
54 Herrmann note 14 above, at 56. 
55 Schünemann note 47 above, at B19. 
56 Ibid. at B109. 
57 Rönnau note 1 above, at 37. 
58 Dahs, Hans 1996 “§153a StPO – Ein „Allheilmittel‟ der Strafrechtspflege” Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1192. 
59 Deal note 20 above, at 550. 
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case has difficult legal issues. If there are problems of evidence, 91 per cent of the judges, 90 
per cent of the prosecutors, and 53 per cent of the defence lawyers in the study preferred an 
informal agreement.
60
 This is especially true for large-scale proceedings, where countless 
documents and witness statements have to be analysed. Frequently, cases are so technical that 
the court is dependent on expensive experts‟ statements. All these factors mean great expense 
and delay for the trial and increase the interest in informal procedures. 
Further, the closeness between the participants is a crucial factor.
61
 Like plea bargaining in 
England and Wales, informal agreements in Germany are based on personal relationships of 
trust. The better the participants know each other and the more positive their previous experi-
ences with each other have been, the more straightforward the negotiations will be. The older 
the relationship between the prosecution and defence lawyer, the more emphasis they will put 
on co-operation rather than contest. Sometimes the negotiations even embrace different cases 
with different defendants and concessions in one case are rewarded in another case. This basic 
element of trust between the professionals is the reason why agreements are seldom breached 
although legally they are not binding. If however the agreement falls apart, the other parties to 
the settlement will feel their trust violated and future negotiations will be threatened.
62
 Since 
some private defence lawyers are dependent on the court to get them appointed as defence 
counsels, they are taking a personal risk that the defendants will keep their promises.
63
 It is 
said that some courts even have „black lists‟ of lawyers who did not keep their agreement. 
Hence the defence lawyer is often interested in not letting the client know the details of the 
deal, so that the defendant cannot obstruct the negotiations.
64
 This also prevents the defendant 
from complaining if the sentence is higher than that agreed on.
65
  
The characteristics of the defendant are likewise decisive. According to Schünemann‟s re-
port, 76 per cent of practitioners stated that juvenile defendants are more willing to agree to 
informal settlements;
66
 89 per cent confirmed higher willingness of older defendants and 91 
per cent stated that defendants with no previous conviction are more ready to reach agree-
ments. Only 36 per cent of the practitioners thought that defendants in a weak financial situa-
tion would be willing to reach settlements, and 29 per cent considered that those with low 
education would be interested to come to an informal agreement. According to Deal defen-
                                                 
60 Braun, Stefan 1998 Die Absprachen im deutschen Strafverfahren (Aachen: Shaker Verlag) at 11. 
61 Ibid, at 13. 
62 Bussmann note 16 above, at 72. 
63 In some cases, the defendant would change her defence counsel and appealed against the sentence, thus 
breaching the initial promise not to appeal. 
64 Or inform the press as has happened in BGHSt NJW 1990, 3030. 
65 Bussmann note 16 above, at 72. 
66 Braun note 60 above, at 10. However, this is only indirect data, as the defendants themselves were not asked. 
I believe that a public figure is very much interested in being spared a public trial. 
  10 
dants who belong to the upper or middle class are more likely to be in favour of reaching set-
tlements with the court and prosecutors and judges are more likely to reach an agreement with 
the defence lawyer if the defendant appears sympathetic to them.
67
 Because of court‟s interest 
in compensation, white-collar criminals benefit because they can offer higher sums.
68
 
Whether the gender of defendant, defence counsel, judge or prosecutor plays any role is not 
addressed in any empirical research. Another aspect considered by judges and prosecutors is, 
as in England and Wales, the victim‟s interest especially in sexual crimes. Informal settle-
ments, which lead to confessions and waivers of evidence production and thus protect the 
victim from having to appear in court and give evidence, are favoured.
69
 
Defence lawyers favour settlements especially in cases in which there is a high probability 
of conviction (96 per cent of the lawyers in Schünemann‟s survey mentioned this reason). In 
this situation in particular, the defence lawyer can show the defendant that although the case 
was hopeless for the client, the lawyer could gain some reduction of the sentence. An informal 
negotiation does not just demonstrate how much influence the lawyer has in court, but more-
over the settlement can be sold as a successful outcome. Other examples of situations in 
which the defence lawyers favour informal settlements, are when they want to protect their 
client from public exposure (83 per cent) and in cases where a high sentence is expected (83 
per cent).
70
 
 
If not all parties favour an agreement, courtroom actors might employ a number of differ-
ent strategies in order to impose pressure on the others to settle. To increase their negotiating 
power, the prosecution might „overload the accusation‟ in order to be able to offer to with-
draw offences from the accusation
71
 - so-called „over-charging‟.72 Another strategy to put 
pressure on the defence is to take advantage of the fact that only the prosecution, and not the 
defence, can request a dismissal or a penal order. Accordingly, the prosecutor can combine an 
offer of dismissal under §153a with a warning that this is the last chance for settling.
73
 More-
over, the prosecutor can indicate that a refusal to accept an agreement could lead to a higher 
sentence recommendation. Obviously, it is not right to punish the defendant for objecting to a 
negotiation with a more severe sentence. However, since the exact final sentence is nearly 
                                                 
67 Deal note 20 above, at 549. 
68 Bussmann note above 16, at 28. 
69 Schünemann note above 47, at B23. 
70 Braun note above 60, at 11. 
71
 Lüdemann, Christian 1994 “Land without Plea Bargaining? How the Germans Do It. Results of an Empirical 
Study” 17 EuroCriminology 119 at 122. 
72
 Blake, Meredith and Ashworth, Andrew, Some Ethical Issues in Prosecuting and Defending Criminal Cases, 
1998, Criminal Law Review, 16, at 28. 
73 Herrmann note 14 above, at 63. 
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impossible to anticipate, it is very hard to evaluate whether the final sentence is more severe 
because of the earlier rejection to settle. An increased sentence might even be an unconscious 
consequence.
74
  
Defence lawyers, on the other hand, use the defendant‟s extensive procedural safeguards 
to threaten the courts with an enormous number of expensive interim appeal motions just to 
initiate an informal settlement of the case,
75
 threatening with very time and cost consuming 
evidence-based proceedings.
76
 They bombard the court with motions of different kinds which 
the court cannot reject without risking an appeal. Thus the trial is artificially prolonged, just to 
enforce a shortening of the procedure through settlement.
77
 The same tactic can be used with 
motions to disqualify the judge.
78
 Compared to England and Wales, the defence counsel in 
Germany is in an advantageous position because they have access to the prosecution‟s dossi-
ers which is not restricted by disclosure rules.
79
 
There are many examples of abuses on both sides and there are even cases known in 
which defendants were put under grave pressure to confess to crimes which they denied hav-
ing committed.
80
 In one case, the lawyer forced the prosecution into a settlement declaring 
that he knew that there was a serious basis for appeal, without revealing the court‟s mistake. 
The prosecutor had a choice between risking the judgement being reversed by the appeal 
court or engaging in negotiations with the defence.
81
 Unfortunately, the literature has to rely 
on anecdotal evidence as there is no systematic empirical research on the extent of severe 
abuses.  
Content of agreements 
The defendant (usually through the lawyer) can offer to confess to all or parts of the accu-
sations, to testify against a co-defendant,
82
 to waive a motion for the admission of evidence, 
or to waive the right to file an appeal.
83
 In addition, the defendant might promise to undertake 
                                                 
74 Ibid, 67. 
75 Leigh, Leonard H and Zedner, Lucia 1992 A Report on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Pre-trial 
Phase in France and Germany The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (London: HMSO) at 41. 
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to pay court costs or indemnification payments
84
 or to waive his own requests for any com-
pensation.
85
 As in England and Wales, the centre of informal negotiations in Germany is the 
confession. However, as in the English discourse on plea bargaining, an essential question is 
what effect a confession should have on the sentence. It is generally accepted that a remorse-
ful confession should generate a sentence reduction. In the case of an informal agreement, 
however, it is more likely that the cause for the confession is the expected sentence reduction 
rather than true remorse. Schmidt-Hieber argues that the possibility of remorse is at least not 
ruled out and that the principle of in dubio pro reo should be accounted for.
86
 Schünemann 
counters that the confession in this case depends on the offer of an advantage and therefore 
cannot indicate unconditional remorse.
87
 On the other hand, Schmidt-Hieber stresses that even 
without remorse the confession‟s value for establishing the facts is sufficient for mitigating 
the sentence.
88
 Moreover, the Federal High Court of Justice
89
 has held that a confession is a 
mitigating factor, even if it is given primarily for tactical reasons.
90
 Additionally, according to 
Widmaier, the ethical effort of admitting to the offence in front of the court, the public and to 
oneself should be rewarded.
91
 On the other hand, especially in the areas of economic, envi-
ronmental and similar crimes, defendants cannot be absolutely convinced of their blamewor-
thiness, because the question often does not depend on the facts (as in traditional crime) but 
rather on definitions and interpretation by the courts.
92
 To express deep remorse is difficult 
under these circumstances. Even more pressing is the relationship between confession and 
truth. As was shown earlier, following the principle of substantive truth the judge has to ex-
amine every confession as to its truthfulness and consider additional evidence if needed. 
However, research reveals that informal agreements drastically undermine this principle. 
When Schünemann asked judges whether they would accept a confession even in a situation 
where the trial had not brought up enough evidence for a conviction, some 72 per cent showed 
themselves ready to accept the confession and to take it as the only basis for conviction.
93
 The 
principle of substantive truth is considerably undermined further if an informal agreement 
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consists of a so-called „slim confession‟. A „slim confession‟ means that the defendant only 
confirms the already known evidence rather than revealing any new facts. This kind of con-
fession is usually formulated by the defence counsel
94
 and then just confirmed by the defen-
dant. The defendant favours a „slim confession‟ because they thus avoid having to release 
details, which might otherwise bring about a harsher sentence or be used in a civil action by 
the victim.
95
 The court too might favour a less elaborate statement of the facts of criminal 
liability because more details of the crime could lead to suspicion among the public who 
might not understand the mild sentence or probationary custody.
96
 Instead of revealing the 
material truth, which is the aim of the German criminal process, the defendant does not ex-
pose any more details than had already been known by the prosecution. In this respect, the 
argument that a confession deserves a sentence reduction because it facilitates fact-finding, is 
no longer applicable. 
The second form of offer by the defendant is to waive or withdraw a motion for the ad-
mission of evidence
97
 in order to shorten the proceeding. The defence also might agree not to 
challenge the admission of certain evidence by the prosecution or the court.
98
 In this way, the 
defendant renounces a considerable part of their procedural rights. Sometimes the defence 
offers additional remedies such as a promise to improve the environmental protection at their 
factory or to waive administrative procedures. 
Most informal settlements include the waiver of the right to file an appeal.
99
 Although any 
promise to waive the right to appeal made by the defendant before the final conviction is not 
legally binding
100
 it is only rarely broken. Even though there are legal remedies against a sen-
tence based on an informal settlement, the defendant rarely uses these, notwithstanding the 
fact that in contrast to professionals, they have no consequences to fear. There are three possi-
ble reasons why the defendant does not challenge the conviction. First of all, they may be 
satisfied with the outcome to which they have agreed. Secondly, they might be reluctant to 
spend more time, money and effort on another process. The third and most serious reason is 
that the defence counsel might not have informed the client about the legal remedies against 
the settlement, or even about the existence of the agreement itself, which the lawyers have 
negotiated on their own.
101
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Besides the dismissal or a penal order, the prime offer the prosecution can make is to rec-
ommend a lower sentence to the court.
102
 As in England and Wales, the result of a settlement 
can also be a downgrading of the charge, for example from attempted manslaughter to dan-
gerous injury
103
 or from perpetrator to abettor.
104
 However, the court is not bound “by the 
offense's evaluation which formed the basis of the order opening the main proceedings.”105 
This means if the evidence during the hearing shows that an act has to be evaluated as the 
higher charge the court has to convict accordingly. If however the court accepts a slim confes-
sion without further investigation it will not have any indication that a higher charge might be 
more appropriate. 
In addition to a sentence reduction the accused might be offered release from custody
106
 
and other coercive measures against them.
107
 Also, the exclusion from the public can be of-
fered in order to maintain the defendant‟s privacy and professional reputation. Especially in 
white-collar crimes, the publicity of a criminal procedure can cause serious financial losses 
owing to the damage done to the reputation of the defendant or their business. Since the pub-
lic can only be excluded if the requirements of §§169ff Judicature Act
108
 are met, informal 
strategies, such as the scheduling of the trial for late afternoon, or not passing information to 
the judicial press service, are used to avoid an audience in the court room.
109
 
Criticisms 
The main criticism in relation to plea bargaining is not so much that the accused is pres-
sured in an undue way as is claimed in England and Wales.
110
 Although such cases might oc-
cur, there is no evidence that this happens more than just exceptionally. Until last year the 
largest part of the academic discourse was instead dealing with the question of whether in-
formal agreements are reconcilable with the German constitution, the general principles of 
criminal procedure, and certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Penal 
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Code.
111
 Principles which were claimed to have been infringed are the presumption of inno-
cence, the right to a fair trial, the right to one‟s lawful judge, the right to judicial hearing, the 
principle of public trial, the principle of substantive truth and court investigation, the princi-
ples of immediacy and orality, the privilege against self-incrimination, the compulsory prose-
cution, the duty of presence of the accused, the prohibition of undue pressure.
112
 Whereas 
most academics held informal settlements an illegal practice, most practitioners were con-
vinced of its compatibility with the German legal system.
113
 Even though in the early 1980s 
the topic of informal case dispositions was considered explosive and disreputable,
114
 many 
authors soon ascribed legality to this practice long before the introduction of the new legisla-
tion this year. The main points can only be summarised here but it will be evident that the 
discourse resembled very much the plea bargaining debate in Anglo-American criminal jus-
tice systems. The main arguments supporting the legality of informal agreements were that 
the Criminal Procedure Code did not forbid them expressly; that there were other provisions 
which allowed negotiations; that a decision based on consensus helped to achieve a fair and 
accepted outcome; and that the practice had been so well established that it was not reversible 
anyway.
115
 The major arguments against informal procedures were that, as long as the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code did not allow them explicitly, they were illegal; that they violated most 
major principles of the criminal process; that they compromised the role of the trial; and that 
they led to arbitrary results with a class bias.
116
 Although informal negotiations played such a 
vital role in Germany‟s criminal justice system for at least 40 years, the literature shows that 
the legality of informal agreements was highly contested in relation to numerous principles 
and provisions. It is interesting to observe how many arguments some authors advanced to 
show that informal procedures are legal,
117
 while before 1982 no one doubted their illegality. 
Only after it was no longer possible to deny that informal negotiations were more than rare 
                                                 
111
 Swenson, Thomas 1995 “The German „Plea Bargaining‟ Debate” Pace International Law Review 373, at 
392ff. 
112
 It is also discussed that courtroom actors engaging in informal agreements might commit offences them-
selves. It is argued that participating professionals might violate §336 Penal Code (perversion of justice), §§258, 
258a Penal Code (preventing prosecution of a guilty person), or according to §240 Penal Code (duress). Like-
wise the betrayal of the client‟s interests (§356 Penal Code) and breach of the duty to observe secrecy (§203 I no. 
3 Penal Code) are discussed in the literature. 
113 Herrmann note 26 above, at 775. 
114 Bussmann note 16 above, at 48. 
115 See Tscherwinka, Ralf 1995 Absprachen im Strafprozeß (Frankfurt am Main: Lang). 
116 Swenson note 111 above, at 392 and 400. 
117 See Tscherwinka note 115 above. 
  16 
exceptions, were justifications sought.
118
 Otherwise, one would have had to recognise and 
admit that judges made wide scale use of illegal means.
119
 
Unfortunately, the discussion of legality failed to address broader questions, such as what 
the development outside informal procedures can tell us about the actual balance of judicial 
and legislative power in Germany, the relation between work-quotas and law obedience, the 
role of legal principles and values, and the relationship between substantive and procedural 
criminal law. Rather, the debate concentrated exclusively on the question of legality and the 
need for regulation. This gap in the discussion is regrettable as, as will be argued below, it 
seems very questionable whether legislation can heal the rift between the traditional theoreti-
cal principles of the formal German criminal procedure and the new informal practice which 
is created to shortcut this procedure. 
Attempted restrictions by court rulings 
In economic crimes, informal settlements have been carried out for years in spite of the 
fact that all participants were aware that the Federal High Court of Justice would not accept 
this practice.
120
 Since a crucial part of the agreement is usually the waiver of the right of ap-
peal only a handful of higher court rulings dealt with informal settlements. But because of an 
increasing number of failed agreements (usually claiming a violation of the principle of free-
dom from coercion under §136a
121
) the Federal High Court of Justice and even the Federal 
Constitutional Court were eventually forced to provide some rulings on this practice.
122
  
The first landmark decision
123
 was delivered by the Federal Constitutional Court
124
 in 
1987 when the appellant claimed that his constitutional rights were violated. In the prelimi-
nary procedure the Court denied having jurisdiction over the present case about an informal 
agreement as it could not identify any drastic violation of constitutional rights. It was held that 
negotiations outside the court in which the partners discuss the prognosis of the case, were not 
generally forbidden as long as the law was respected. In this case there was no violation of 
any procedural law because the presenting of evidence at trial had been nearly completed and 
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the final sentence was commensurate with the offender‟s guilt. In addition the Court stated 
that the free choice of the defendant had not been violated in an unlawful way. However, like 
the Court of Appeal in Turner,
125
 the Federal Constitutional Court
126
 established a set of rules 
under which informal settlements could be accepted:
127
 first, all participants have to be in-
volved and any negotiations including their contents have to be set out in the main trial hear-
ing. The settlement must not include any ultra vires promises and the agreed outcome must be 
lawful and justifiable. Further, the agreement is not binding, but there must be no divergence 
without reason. Finally, following the principle of substantive truth, the defendant‟s confes-
sion has to be examined by the court to determine if it is genuine. Setting out these limita-
tions, the Court seemed to acknowledge the general validity of informal settlements.
128
 How-
ever opponents pointed out that only in these very restricted circumstances would negotiations 
be allowed, but that the majority of informal settlements would fall outside these limits and 
were therefore illegal. 
The Federal High Court of Justice passed a number of confusing rulings regarding spe-
cific aspects of informal agreements, without however addressing whether the practice in gen-
eral was permissible. In 1989 it was held that the trial judge was allowed to contact the parties 
outside the courtroom but the Federal High Court of Justice did not deal with the question of 
whether this contact could amount to any negotiations with the parties.
129
 The Court made 
clear that if the trial court raised certain sentence expectations the defendant could rely on 
them but it is not clear whether it was allowed to raise such expectations in the first place.
130
 
In a tax evasion case in 1990 the Court held that the prosecution‟s offer to drop some charges 
if the defendant accepted a penal order would not preclude proceedings against the withdrawn 
charges later but would be considered mitigating circumstances.
131
 In another case of the 
same year
132
 the Court again avoided dealing explicitly with the legality of informal settle-
ments in general, but held that in the present case the judges had been biased because they 
negotiated with the two co-defendants but not with the appellant, who was not informed about 
the settlement. One year later, the court declared that informal agreements contradict the rule 
of law,
133
 and in another decision of the same year, it clarified that the agreement does not 
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bind the trial court as this could render judges biased.
134
 Further, it now criticised the practice 
of informal negotiations in the strongest terms. Any informal contact should be limited to 
„feeling out‟ the parties, without dealing with questions of sentencing or probation. However, 
only a couple of months later a different Senate
135
 of the same court disallowed an informal 
settlement for specific reasons, rather than reasoning that they were generally impermissi-
ble.
136
 In 1993 it was confirmed that extra-trial settlements would not necessarily prejudice 
the court‟s judgement.137 The decisions of the Federal High Court of Justice on the practice of 
informal negotiations have been ambiguous throughout and consequently the interpretation of 
the rulings highly debated.
138
 The Court seemed to oscillate between criminal procedural 
principles on the one hand and the pragmatic necessity of informal agreements on the other. 
In an obiter dictum the Court stated the incompatibility of informal settlements with the legal 
system,
139
 but made a contrary ruling soon after.
140
 It explained that the solution lay in a lin-
guistic distinction between illegal „accordance‟ (Absprache) and legal „understanding‟ (Ver-
ständigungen), but the Court did not provide any criteria to distinguish between the two forms 
in practice. 
In a landmark decision in 1997, the Fourth Senate of the Federal High Court of Justice de-
clared informal settlements “not prohibited” if they were within certain limits:141 The negotia-
tion has to take place in the main trial hearing, although discussions in the course of prepara-
tion are allowed if the result is revealed during the main trial. Further, all participants (includ-
ing co-defendants) have to be informed. The trial court is not relieved from its obligation to 
find the objective truth and thus has to investigate the credibility of the confession. As a con-
sequence the verdict of guilt of any offence must not be part of the negotiation. Further, a con-
fession made as part of the informal negotiation has a mitigating effect but the court is not 
allowed to indicate the exact sentence. However, it is permissible to indicate the maximum 
penalty that could be expected. Threats or undue promises are forbidden. The same is true for 
a waiver of the right to appeal by the defence.
142
 As will be shown later, it is especially the 
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last rule which is generally disregarded in practice.
143
 Since this decision the Federal High 
Court of Justice repeatedly emphasized that although the practice of informal negotiations 
was developed praetor legem it is now a necessary part of the German criminal justice system 
and thus permissible within the restrictions of the 1997 decision.
144
 However, these guidelines 
were met with incomprehension by the general judiciary who felt they would not address their 
concerns. The restrictive limits of the ruling did not reflect the practice of informal negotia-
tions and practitioners felt that the Federal High Court of Justice was too remote from the day 
to day work of trial courts to understand the practical necessities. The 1997 decision did not 
prove to be the final clarifying decision many had been waiting for. Seven years later there 
were still discrepancies between the five criminal Senates of the Federal High Court of Justice 
regarding informal agreements.
145
 In 2004, the Third Senate put the question of validity of 
waivers of appeal as part of the agreement to the Joint Senate of the Federal High Court of 
Justice.
146
 The Joint Senate confirmed once again the general permissibility of informal 
agreements within the guidelines of the 1997 decision
147
 but limited the waiver of appeal.
148
 
The court made clear that if the judgement is based on an informal agreement any waiver of 
appeal by the defendant was not binding unless the defendant has been informed by the court 
that they were not bound by any promises to waive the right to appeal made previously as part 
of the agreement, the so-called „qualified information‟. 149 Moreover, the court declared that 
“the limits of judicial lawmaking” had been reached and called for action by the legislator.150 
The new legislation 
The German legislator followed the call of the Federal High Court of Justice, and on May 
28, 2009 the German Federal Parliament passed the Bill for the Regulation of Agreements in 
the Criminal Procedure
151
 which formalises agreements during the criminal trial. Except for 
some minor changes the legislation largely follows the guidelines set out by the Federal High 
Court of Justice. A new section (§257c)
152
 was introduced into the German Criminal Proce-
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dure Code which allows for and regulates agreements without – so it is claimed153 – infringing 
on the principles of the German criminal procedure. 
 
The new provision regulates the agreement between the court, the prosecution and the de-
fence. An agreement becomes valid when the court announces the possible content of the 
agreement and both prosecution and defence consent.
154
 It is not clear what legal status 
agreements have that have been made before or outside trial. §160b allows for communica-
tions between prosecution and defence before trial (“if they appear to be suitable to further the 
proceedings”) which need to be read into the record but it is unclear whether binding agree-
ments between prosecution and defence without the involvement of the court are prohibited or 
simply not part of the new regulation.  
The new provision is aimed at preserving the principle of substantive truth. Only if the 
court is convinced that the offence has been fully investigated and there are grounds for be-
lieving that the admission of guilt is genuine can the judgement follow. This confirms the 
Federal High Court of Justice ruling that a mere “formal admission” (in which the defendant 
only admits guilt but does not make any statement about the facts) does not suffice for a 
judgement.
155
 It follows that the settlement must not include an agreement about a verdict of 
guilt.
156
 This provision also excludes any negotiations that in the common law system would 
be called charge bargaining. However, charge bargaining very likely occurs before the trial 
between prosecution and defendant. It was shown before that the negotiation about different 
charges is invaluable for both defence and prosecution and it is very questionable whether 
§257c(2) will be able to end these kinds of negotiations. 
All negotiations before and during trial have to be announced during the main trial hearing 
and read into the record.
157
 The recording of all negotiations and agreements serves transpar-
ency and furthermore ensures that all arrangements can be revised by an appeal court. Ac-
cording to the new §273(1a), even the absence of any agreement needs to be recorded. From 
now on the record of every trial needs to include clarification of whether there has been any 
agreement or not. This is an important step to move “plea bargaining” out of the shadow of 
informality into the field of regulated, transparent and controllable formal procedure. 
To ensure the principle of fair trial and protect the defendant, §257c(4) rules that unless 
new facts emerge (be they related to the crime itself or the behaviour of the defendant after 
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the agreement), the trial court is bound by its initial prognosis of punishment.
158
 This stipula-
tion protects defendant expectations but ensures that the final sentence does reflect the known 
facts and not merely the agreement. If the trial court feels that it cannot sentence according to 
its initial sentence prognosis the admission of guilt cannot be used as evidence. This rule at-
tempts to restore the status quo before the agreement, in particular the presumption of inno-
cence. However, it will be very difficult for the trial court
159
 to disregard a confession after it 
had previously accepted it which it can only do if it was convinced, according to the concept 
of substantive truth, that it was genuine. One can easily imagine a situation in which the de-
fendant submits a credible confession that concurs with other evidence but later new aggravat-
ing facts arise and the trial court cannot justify its initial indication of maximum sentence. In 
this case the agreement falls apart, the court is not bound by its promise, and the defendant‟s 
confession is presumed not to have been made. It is not realistic to expect the court to disre-
gard a confession which it was convinced was true now that additional aggravating facts have 
arisen. Even if the court is able to disregard completely the earlier credible admission of guilt, 
if the defendant is convicted it will be hard for them as well as the public to believe that the 
court was not prejudiced by the previous confession. 
The second central aspect of the new law is the waiver of appeal. Following the guidelines 
of the Federal High Court of Justice, according to §§35a, 302(1) a waiver of appeal must not 
be part of any agreement. Further, whenever a judgement involves an agreement any waiver 
of appeal (even if it was not part of the agreement) is only valid if the defendant has received 
the qualified information explained above. This means if a case involves an agreement and the 
defendant waives their right to appeal the court has to explain to the defendant that if this 
waiver was part of the deal they are not bound by it.
160
 Only if the defendant sticks to the 
waiver after being thus informed by the court does it become valid. The aim of this strict rule 
is to ensure that agreements are open to revision by the appeal courts. It is hoped that this ju-
diciary control will guarantee that all agreements are within the legal boundaries and thus 
establish legitimacy for this practice. However, like the Federal High Court of Justice before, 
the legislator has overlooked the flaw of this reasoning. The waiver of an appeal by the defen-
dant has potentially two invaluable benefits for the trial judge. First, without the prospect of 
an appeal, the judgement does not need to be formulated with the same care as if it were open 
to review by a higher court. Secondly, every appeal is a challenge to the rightfulness and qual-
ity of the judge‟s decision. The fewer cases of an individual judge that are reviewed by a 
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higher court, the fewer decisions are overruled, which is important for the judge‟s career ap-
praisals. The defence lawyer too, is unlikely to favour an appeal that will damage the trust-
based working relationship with court and prosecutor and might threaten future negotiations. 
Thus a judicial review of cases based on informal agreements is not in the interest of the prac-
titioners and it does not come as a surprise that this rule was regularly disregarded. It is more 
than questionable whether the new legislation will be able to change this. 
Another problem related to the waiver of appeal is the time limit for the defendant. If the 
defendant declares a waiver of appeal without receiving the qualified information and then 
decides to appeal after all, they can do so only within the ordinary time limits for appeals, 
which is one week after pronouncement of the judgement
161
. The Federal High Court of Jus-
tice explicitly ruled that the time limit cannot be extended for defendants who have entered an 
agreement because this would put them in a better position than defendants who have not par-
ticipated in a settlement.
162
 In practice this means that defendants who are not informed by the 
court that they are not bound by their initial waiver of appeal can only file an appeal if they 
find out that their initial waiver is invalid within one week after the judgement.  If court and 
defence counsel agree to a settlement which illegally includes a waiver of appeal it is doubtful 
that they will later inform the defendant that this part of the deal is not binding. As was argued 
before, an appeal is not in the interest of any of the courtroom actors. The future will show if 
courts will take advantage of this loophole. Marsch guesses that the waiver of appeal will not 
end but only be made invisible.
163
  
 
Considering the little impact the rulings of the Federal High Court of Justice had on the 
practice of informal negotiations, the main question is whether the new legislation (which 
adds little in substance) will be followed by the courtroom actors. Since the debate of infor-
mal agreements started in Germany calls for legislative regulation of the practice have been 
voiced. It was argued that the legislator needed to regulate the practice and lift it out of the 
informality so that courtroom actors would not need to act outside the Criminal Procedure 
Code anymore. However, Nestler-Tremel pointed out that legality was only a theoretical 
problem, for in practice the defendant usually waived the right to appeal and thus withdrew 
the negotiations from any formal control.
164
 Besides, informal settlements were carried out 
long before practitioners even dared to admit it. Even if proponents later argued that informal 
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agreements would fit into the German criminal law system, initially the participants did not 
believe them to be legal but used them on a regular basis nevertheless.
165
 If the judiciary de-
veloped its own system believing the procedure to be illegal, it is doubtful they would accept 
legal regulations and restrictions.
166
 Meyer-Gossner even declared that informal agreements 
“are going to shape the legal everyday life with or without legislation.”167 Schünemann on the 
other hand disapproved of this viewpoint and called it an unrealistic insult to the German ju-
diciary.
168
 However, the development of the dismissal which was repeatedly extended by the 
legislator to follow praetor legem development of the informal practice by the judiciary
169
 
supports Meyer-Gossner‟s view. Bussmann‟s research confirmed that the question of legality 
did not play a notable role for the professionals. The practitioners were led by quotidian re-
quirements rather than by the formal law and consequently they were not particularly con-
cerned wither the question of law should be changed.
170
 It was not so much that the practitio-
ners suppress the praxis-law conflict, but rather that the formal law plays an inferior role in 
the daily practice. When considering whether to initiate an informal negotiation, participants 
calculate the benefits and drawbacks, rather than its compatibility with the law.
171
 Thus for-
mal law is replaced by an informal but established code of conduct.
172
 Widmaier made the 
reality of the practice very clear: “Settlements in criminal procedure do exists. They do not 
need to be first legalised, nor can they be prohibited.”173 Concluding from this experience it is 
very questionable whether the courtroom actors will adapt their practice-driven customs to the 
limits of the new §257c. Meyer-Goßner points out that judges and prosecutors are less likely 
to ignore legislation than judge-made law because they could commit the criminal offence of 
perversion of justice according to §339 German Penal Code.
174
 However, this threat seems not 
to have been strong enough to prevent the judiciary and prosecutors from developing exten-
sive informal practices outside the law of dismissal and penal order in the first place.
175
 Since 
the appeal courts have developed the rules which have become now written law, it must be 
expected that appeal courts will support the new legislation, but of course they will only have 
the opportunity to do so if the trial courts use agreements openly.  
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The future will reveal whether the new legislation will succeed in lifting the agreements 
out of informality into the realm of the formal procedure. The present author has serious 
doubts whether the formalisation of a practice which derives its attraction from its informality 
can be realised. 
The chasm between theoretical values and practical necessities 
As in England and Wales, the merits of informal negotiations for the German criminal 
process are highly contested. Whereas most practitioners praise the usefulness and even the 
necessity of informal procedures, many academics point out that this practice is not compati-
ble with the basic values of the German criminal justice system. But there is a third essential 
theme which is missing in the debate. The present author argues that the development of in-
formal procedures in Germany, as with plea bargaining in England and other common law 
systems, leads to the development of an informal system which runs parallel to the formal 
process without either Higher Courts or legislation being able to prevent or at least control it. 
This opens questions not only about the power of the judiciary in general but also whose role 
it is to close the chasm between theoretical values and practical necessities in general. The 
legislator in Germany had the opportunity to engage in a debate about the tension between the 
two but unfortunately did not address this question at all. 
 It has been argued above that the core reason for the start of informal settlements in Ger-
many was the change in the nature of the substantive criminal law without adaptation of the 
procedural law. Both the German Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code date from the 
19
th
 century when crimes were comparatively simple to define and generally corresponded to 
the understanding of an average person. In modern society, with the increasing introduction of 
crimes that cause danger (rather than harm), common sense is no longer sufficient to establish 
the boundary between permissible and criminal conduct.
176
 The main question is often not the 
identity of the offender but whether an offence was committed in the first place. The conduct 
of the accused has not to be indentified but interpreted. For example the trial court might not 
need to establish whether the defendant has transferred money but whether this transaction 
amounted to money laundering. This means criminal law has been extended to offences which 
do not fit under the conventional criminal procedure law. Not surprisingly the courtroom ac-
tors have had to adapt their way of handling these cases and court behaviour has become less 
characteristic of criminal but typical for administrative law: 
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Through giving up the punitive, repressive paradigm in favour of an economic paradigm and 
abandonment of hierarchical, authoritarian forms of interaction in favour of cooperative, con-
sent orientated forms of process, criminal procedures become increasingly similar to adminis-
trative law procedures, solving conflicts of interests […] by negotiation.177 
 
Hence, legal practice finds itself in a quandary between, on the one hand formal proce-
dural law which is still oriented toward the principle of material truth and on the other hand 
substantive criminal law, which blurs the boundaries between allowed behaviour and criminal 
conduct and thus pushes towards formal truth on which the participants agree. As certain be-
haviours were transferred to the more repressive criminal law, the criminal trial itself was 
replaced by informal negotiations where the offender can now negotiate and avoid public 
stigmatisation. The fact that more and more offences have been transferred from administra-
tive law into criminal law in order to exercise more repressive control on white-collar crime, 
ironically has had the effect that criminal courts increasingly might replace the trial with less 
repressive, consensus orientated negotiations. While this is welcome in most cases by the de-
fendant and all courtroom actors it disregards the interest of the public in proportionate pun-
ishment and fair labelling of the crime. 
The increasing re-structure of criminal law as a device of citizen protection into a flexible 
mechanism of state intervention is the wrong answer to the right question of how social risks 
can be dealt with.
178
 
 
Rather than formally measuring the new substantive law against the traditional core values 
of criminal procedure and adapting one to the other, it has been left to the courtroom actors to 
square this circle. As in England and Wales, in Germany too, two law systems, i.e. the formal 
trial and the informal case disposition started to work alongside each other.
179
 This develop-
ment is easier to accept in common law systems as judges are allowed and indeed asked to 
develop law. In civil law countries, too, the development of customary law is acknowledged 
to some degree. Herrmann holds that criminal justice is a “living organism” and hence it is 
possible to develop it against the law.
180
 Also, Schünemann regards the increasing use of in-
formal settlements in Germany as a form of development of customary law.
181
 However, the 
development of customary law finds its limits in the fundamental principle of law and the rule 
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of law. And as was shown above, the legality of informal agreements was always highly con-
tested. But there is a more fundamental problem with informal criminal procedures, i.e. the 
consequences of the duality of systems. When two systems exist side to side, the crucial ques-
tion is who has the power to decide which system is used in which case and which criteria are 
taken into account in this decision? The main argument of the proponents of plea bargaining 
in England and Wales and informal agreements in Germany is that the defendant has the 
choice between safeguards and sanction reduction. However, this argument has two crucial 
flaws: first, the defendant often does not have the necessary information to make this rational 
decision. They lack insight into the practices and routines of the court, they have no access to 
the prosecutor‟s files, and it is seldom possible for a lay person to evaluate the strength of the 
prosecutor‟s evidence especially in large-scale procedures. As a consequence the defendant 
will be dependent on the decisions made by the lawyers, who have their own interests in 
mind. Secondly, even if the defendants themselves have a choice, the divergence from a for-
mal trial silences both the public (who are denied an audience at trial and whose interests are 
no longer represented by the prosecution, who again follow their own interests) as well as the 
victim. In both adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems it is the legal profession-
als who decide which cases are „worthy‟ of a full trial and which are to be disposed of infor-
mally. However, there are no guidelines on the criteria for this decision and it seems that this 
is an area of absolute uncontrolled discretion.
182
 As was shown above the criteria of selecting 
cases for plea negotiations are very random and more related to the person of the defendant 
than the interest of the public. 
Squaring the circle 
Informal agreements have spread so widely to all types of crime because the work pres-
sure of under-resourced courts and prosecution offices have led to a change of priorities in the 
values of the criminal process. It is now the maxim of efficiency that often has to assume first 
priority in decision making by legal professionals.
183
 Since negotiations among the profes-
sionals have turned out to be much more efficient than contesting the case, traditional values 
of fair trial and proportionate sentencing have to make place for the new value of „process 
economy‟.184 The new legislation claims to square the circle of plea bargaining, making it 
possible to profit from all the advantages of informal agreements while at the same time up-
holding the main principles of the formal criminal trial. However, it is doubtful whether the 
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new procedure can combine the benefits of informal agreements while preserving the safe-
guards of the formal procedure at the same time. First of all, the new legislation focuses on 
agreements between all parties during the trial whereas in reality many deals are struck before 
the main hearing and often without the participation of the court. Thus a great number of ne-
gotiations fall outside the new legislation. Secondly, as the confession is not sufficient to es-
tablish the defendant‟s guilt automatically, the court is expected to study the dossier carefully 
and satisfy itself that there are no legal or factual obstacles to the agreed outcome.
185
 It has to 
be seen to what extent the validity of the confession will be examined by the courts. As one of 
the main reasons for the development of informal agreements was the shortening of proceed-
ings it is open to question whether courtroom actors are now inclined to lengthen them. One 
could argue that a hearing which examines the validity of the admission of guilt is still shorter 
than a full trial but experience shows that courtroom actors often do not feel that they can af-
ford the time to check the validity of the confession. Thus, with hindsight it is not surprising 
that courtroom actors repeatedly disregarded the Federal High Court of Justice rulings and 
continued to extend the use of informal negotiations. Legislation which reiterates rules that 
have proven to be unacceptable to courtroom actors will hardly be able to change a well es-
tablished practice. 
Last, but by no means least, the question of appeal, which opens the practice to supervi-
sion of the higher courts, has not been addressed appropriately by the legislator. There is no 
disagreement that undue pressure, be it threats or inappropriate promises, are forbidden and 
render any agreement void. The essential question is how the authenticity of the confession 
can be tested. It is the informality of the negotiations, where the courtroom actors can speak 
literally off the record without having to fear to offer reason for appeal that makes informal 
negotiations so attractive. The informality is the reasn why the attempts to render negotiations 
and agreements more visible by the Federal High Court of Justice rulings were opposed by the 
practitioners and waivers of appeals are made regularly part of the settlement. It is doubtful 
whether this procedure can combine the benefits of informal agreements while preserving the 
safeguards of the formal procedure at the same time. 
 
It has been shown throughout the paper that informal agreements have been developed as 
a response to the growing gap between theoretical values of the formal process and the practi-
cal demands on the courtroom actors. The development of an informal practice which has 
been developed outside the written law and outside the explicit rulings of both the Federal 
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Constitutional Court and the Federal High Court of Justice proves how wide this gap is. On 
the one hand substantive criminal law, which today is used to solve different social problems 
from when the Penal Code was first written in the nineteenth century, has changed its func-
tion. On the other hand, the notion of criminal procedure and the role of punishment have 
shifted. Neither is reflected in the development of the formal criminal trial. The irreconcilabil-
ity between traditional criminal procedure and modern criminal law seems to have been an 
overlooked side effect of reforms in material criminal law. Considering how much weight is 
given to the core values and how much pride is placed in the term „rule of law‟, a departure 
from such values has to be consciously considered. Rather then leaving it to the courts to cope 
with the strains of new procedures, the elected legislature as well as civil society has to decide 
how to reconcile material and procedural criminal justice. The solution for this enormous task 
cannot be found in criminal law and criminal procedural law alone,
186
 but by taking a broader 
look on an inter-disciplinary basis, for example by considering options such as the reforma-
tion of tax law and accounting law, a re-transfer of certain offences to administrative law, and 
a reconsideration of the criminalisation of certain offences of risk creating, etc. 
The rules, which the Federal High Court developed and the legislator reiterated, neither 
discussed these underlying tensions nor did they succeed in formulating a procedure that 
would help the courtroom actors to serve the demands of both procedural and substantive 
criminal law. It seems that both the Federal High Court of Justice and the legislator assume 
the problems are solved as soon as they give the courtroom actors the extra freedom they are 
demanding. This approach demonstrates a lack of understanding of the underlying conflict 
between the different demands on the legal practitioners. Although regulation of previously 
informal negotiations in criminal law is welcome, unfortunately the legislator failed to debate 
of the role of modern criminal law.  
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